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CASE COMMENT
INTERNATIONAL LAW: HONORING THE LETTER AND
SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
Lozano v Montoya Alvarez; 134 S. Ct. 1224 (2014)
Andres R. Cordova*
FACTS
Petitioner sought to have the Supreme Court equitably toll the one
year period for seeking return of his abducted child under Article Twelve
of the Hague Convention of International Child Abduction
(Convention).' Petitioner filed in district court for the immediate return
of his child to the United Kingdom.2 Article Twelve of the Convention
mandates the return of an abducted child when a parent files a petition for
the child's return one year or less from the date of abduction.3 After the
one year period, the courts must order the child's return unless the child
has become settled in its new environment.4 Petitioner contended that the
concealment of his child by Respondent was an extraordinary
circumstance that prevented him from filing within a year of the child's
abduction.5 The district court denied Petitioner's petition because the one
year period in Article Twelve had expired, the common-law doctrine of
equitable tolling did not apply to the one year period, and the child had
become settled in the United States.6 Petitioner appealed the district
court's decision to the Second Circuit, which affirmed.7 Petitioner then
appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which granted
certiorari in order to determine whether Article Twelve's one year period
* Mr. Cordova received his J.D. from the University of Florida, Levin College of Law.
As an associate attorney of Wermuth Law, P.A., Mr. Cordova practices commercial litigation and
business law in Miami, Florida.
1. Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1228 (2014).
2. Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 809 F. Supp. 2d 197, 202 (2011).
3. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction art. 12, Oct. 25, 1980,
T.I.A.S. No. 11670, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-11 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. This remedy is
only available where the petitioning parent establishes that the child has been wrongfully removed
from the state of its habitual residence. See id. art. 3 (defining wrongful removal).
4. Hague Convention, supro note 3, art. 12.
5. Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 226.
6. Id. Petitioner filed the petition for return on November 10, 2010 and his child was
removed from the United Kingdom on July 3, 2009. Thus, the one year period of automatic return
had expired. Id. at 219.
7. Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 45 (2012).
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is subject to equitable tolling.8 HELD, Article Twelve's one year deadline
is not subject to equitable tolling because equitable tolling is contrary to
the intent of the parties to the Convention.
9
II. HISTORY
A. The Hague Convention
The Convention is an international treaty whose primary goals are: (1)
"to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or
retained in any Contracting State," and (2) "to ensure the rights of custody
and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively
respected in the other Contracting States."'0 The Convention is a non-
self-executing treaty that has been implemented in the United States by
the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA)." I Under
Article Twelve of the Convention, a petitioning parent can seek the
immediate return of a child to the child's country of habitual residence
when the child has been "wrongfully removed or retained," and "a period
of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal
or retention."'12 After one year, the "Settled Defense" becomes available,
which compels the courts to consider whether the child has become
"settled in its new environment."' 13 Article Twelve is intended to
discourage parents from abducting children in order to forum-shop in the
hopes of gaining a legal advantage in custody disputes.'4
B. US. Common-Law
A statute of limitation is "[a]law that bars claims after a specified
period."'15 A statute of limitations is presumptively subject to equitable
tolling.16 "Equitable tolling is a common-law doctrine that allows a
litigant to toll a statute of limitations when the litigant establishes two
8. Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 133 S. Ct. 2851 (2013).
9. Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1236 (2014).
10. Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 1.
11. International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 42 Pub. L. No. 100-300, 102
Stat. 437 (1988) (codified as amended 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9011 (2015)).
12. Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 12.
13. Id. See Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1234 ("the expiration of the 1-year period opens the door
to consideration of... the child's interest in settlement").
14. See Elisa Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report, para. 16 [hereinafter Perez-Vera Report],
available at www.hcch.net/upload/expl28.pdf. Elisa Perez-Vera is recognized as the official
reporter for the Hague Conference. See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 52 (2012).
15. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
16. Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43,49 (2002).
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elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that
some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way."'
17
C. The Current State of the Law
Prior to the instant case, the Supreme Court had not addressed the
applicability of equitable tolling to the Convention.18 However, several
circuit courts had addressed the issue.19 Generally, the courts that have
found equitable tolling applicable have concluded that: (1) equitable
tolling is necessary to deter child abduction by parents seeking access to
defenses that would otherwise be unavailable, and (2) the one year period
qualifies as a statute of limitations, which is presumably subject to
equitable tolling.20 For example, in Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702 (1 lth
Cir. 2004), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court's decision to toll
the beginning of the one year period to the date when a petitioning parent
discovers the whereabouts of his or her child.21 The Furnes Court
concluded that the petitioner had made diligent efforts to locate his child,
and therefore, the goals of the Convention would be furthered by denying
any benefit to the respondent hat derived from the child's concealment.2
Notably, the Furnes court presumed that the one year period in Article
Twelve, and codified in ICARA, constituted a statute of limitations.
23
In Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, predecessor to the instant case, the
Second Circuit held that Article Twelve is not subject to equitable
tolling.24 First, the Second Circuit concluded that the one year period is
not a statute of limitations since the remedy of return continued to be
available after one year.25 Thus, the Second Circuit rendered irrelevant
any presumption that equable tolling applied to the one year period.26 The
Second Circuit relied extensively on the drafting history of the
Convention to conclude that equitable tolling was not intended to apply
17. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).
18. Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1231.
19. See e.g., Fumes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (indicating that the one year
period is subject to equitable tolling where an abducting parent conceals the child's whereabouts).
Contra Lozano, 697 F.3d at 45 (holding that equitable tolling is inapplicable to the one year period
and the Convention).




24. Lozano, 697 F.3d at 52.
25. Id. "Unlike a statute of limitations prohibiting a parent from filing a return petition after
a year has expired, the settled defense merely permits courts to consider the interests of a child
who has been in a new environment for more than a year before ordering that child to be returned
to her country of habitual residence." Id.
26. Id.
3
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In the instant case, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit by
holding equitable tolling inapplicable to the one year period provided by
Article Twelve.
28
First, the Court emphasized that the Convention is a treaty, and
therefore, its interpretation is not aided by the general rules of common-
law.29 Thus, although statutes of limitations are presumptively subject to
equitable tolling at common-law, the Court considered this presumption
immaterial.30 Notably, the Court made clear that it considered ICARA
irrelevant since ICARA does not address equitable tolling and because
ICARA does not purport to alter the Convention.
31
Second, the Court determined that the parties to the Convention did
not intend for equitable tolling to apply to the Convention.3 2 Notably,
Petitioner failed to identify a background principle of equitable tolling
shared by the parties to the Convention.
33
Third, assuming arguendo that the parties to the Convention shared
equitable tolling as a background principle of law, the Court concluded
that the one year period is not a statute of limitations since the remedy of
return could still be pursued after the one year period.34 Thus, the one
year period is not a statute of limitations.
35
Finally, the Court addressed Petitioner's argument that equitable
tolling should apply to the one year period because its application would
further the Convention's goal of deterring child abductions.36 However,
the Court noted that the Convention does not pursue this goal at any
27. Id. at 52-54 (indicating that the Hague Convention's drafters "saw value in agreeing to
a 'single time-limit of one year' and setting aside 'the difficulties encountered in establishing a
child's whereabouts."') (quoting Perez-Vera Report, supra note 14, para. 108).
28. Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1236.
29. Id. at 1232-34.
30. Id. at 1233.
3 1. "The provisions of [ICARA] are in addition to and not in lieu of the provisions of the
Convention." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting ICARA § 9001(b)(2)).
32. Id.; see Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 650 (2004) (indicating that the
courts are tasked with interpreting treaties in a manner that is "consistent with the shared
expectations of the contracting parties") (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985)).
33. As a matter of fact, "Lozano concede[d] that in the context of the Convention, 'foreign
courts have failed to adopt equitable tolling ... because they lac[k] the presumption that we
have."' Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1233 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 19-20, Lozano, 134
S. Ct. at 1233 (No. 12-820)).
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cost.37 In the Court's view, applying equitable tolling to the one year
period would essentially rewrite the Convention.38 Further, the Court
noted that concealment is generally considered a negative factor when
determining whether the Settled Defense applies.39 Thus, the doctrine of
equitable tolling is not needed in order to deal with concealment.
40
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Applicable Rules of Interpretation
In deciding the instant case, the Supreme Court emphasized that
different rules of interpretation apply to international treaties and
domestic legislation.4' Domestic legislation is enacted "against a
background of common-law principles," whereas, international treaties
are essentially compacts between parties the parties to a treaty.42 Thus,
when interpreting a treaty, the intent of the parties is dispositive.43 By
focusing its analysis on the intent of the parties to the Convention, the
Court announced to the international community that the United States
will not obscure the meaning of the treaties to which it is a signatory. This
message is especially meaningful as applied to the Convention because
of ICARA.
Arguably, the Court could have concluded that United States
common-law applied to the interpretation of the Convention since
ICARA is federal legislation.44 However, the Court rejected this approach
without much discussion.45 The Court's analysis on this point opens the
door to conflicts between implementing statutes and their underlying
international treaties. For example, what result would the Court reach if
confronted with implementing legislation that is properly considered a
statute of limitations? Further, what if the intent of the parties to the treaty




38. Id. at 1235.
39. Id. at 1236.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1233-34.
42. Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991).
43. United States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494, 535 (1900).
44. Most courts that have found equitable tolling applicable have done exactly this. See
e.g., Fumes, 362 F.3d at 723.
45. Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1233-34. "Congress' mere enactment of implementing legislation
did not somehow import background principles of American law into the treaty interpretation
process, thereby altering our understanding of the treaty itself." Id.
46. One possible solution would be for the eradication of implementing statutes and the
5
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B. The Intent of the Parties to the Hague Convention
The parties to the Convention did not intend for equitable tolling to
apply to its provisions.47 As the Court noted, the drafters of the
Convention wrestled with the one year deadline.48 Nonetheless, the
drafters chose the deadline in order to create a bright-line rule for when a
child's interests should take precedence over the interests of the child's
petitioning parent.49 Thus, the Court refused to second-guess Article
Twelve.
50
C. Is the One Year Period a Statute of Limitations?
The Court's decision to address whether the one year period is a
statute of limitations was unnecessary since the Court had already
concluded that ICARA was immaterial to its analysis and that the drafters
of the Convention did not intend for equitable tolling to apply.
51
Nonetheless, the Court addressed the issue, possibly in an attempt to
avoid more complex constitutional issues, such as whether common-law
presumptions could theoretically apply to implementing legislation.
52
A statute of limitation is "[a]law that bars claims after a specified
period.' '53 Thus, if the one year period is a statute of limitations, a
petitioner under Article Twelve would be barred from seeking the remedy
of return after one year. However, this is not the case.54 The Court made
clear that the one year period is not a statute of limitations since the
remedy of return continues to be available after one year.55 The expiration
distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties since treaties are arguably
effective at the moment of their ratification under the Supremacy Clause. See Carlos Manuel
Vdzquez, Treaties As Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of
Treaties, 122 HARv. L. REV. 599, 600 (2008) (suggesting that all treaties should be enforceable at
the moment of ratification pursuant to the Supremacy Clause).
47. See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 14, para. 107 (indicating that the fixed one year
period, "although perhaps arbitrary," was the best option).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1232.
51. Id. at 1233-34.
52. If the one year period is a statute of limitations, the Court's short dismissal of
Petitioner's contention that ICARA is domestic legislation which opens the door to the application
of United States common-law would require more attention. Further, ICARA explicitly states that
it does not purport to alter the Convention. ICARA § 9001 (b)(2). However, what result if this was
not the case?
53. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
54. Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 12.
55. See generally Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1233. The alternative would require courts to
distinguish between claims and remedies of the same name that nonetheless differ in terms of the
judicial standards attached to their granting.
[Vol. 27
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of the one year period merely permits the child's best interests to take
precedence by way of the Settled Defense.56 Although many courts have
disagreed with the Court on this point, the Court's conclusion appears to
promote uniformity.
57
D. Petitioner 's Policy Argument
Petitioner argued that equitable tolling should apply to the one year
period in order to promote the Convention's goal of deterring child
abductions.58 The Court agreed "that the Convention reflects a design to
discourage child abduction."59 However, the Court disagreed that this
presumes the applicability of equitable tolling.6 0 On this point, the Court
first noted that the Convention does not pursue the goal of deterring child
abduction at all costs.6 1 Instead, the drafters intended for the Convention
to have a shifting framework with bright-line thresholds.62 In this way,
the Convention could account for the needs of individuals as well as the
general goals for which it was drafted.63
Interestingly, the Court did not discuss equitable discretion under
Article Eighteen.6 4 Instead, the Court indicated that concealment is
commonly considered a negative factor under the Settled Defense.65 The
concurring opinion discussed equitable discretion and the courts' ability
to order return even where a child is settled.66 As a result, the concurring
opinion potentially elevated the extent of equitable discretion wielded by
the courts even though the Settled Defense appears to be non-
56. See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 14, para. 25 (indicating that a determination of the
child's best interests is the guiding criterion of the exceptions to return).
57. Courts no longer have to consider whether return during the one year period is a
different remedy or claim as return subject to the Settled Defense after the one year period. See
supra text accompanying note 56.
58. Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1235-36.
59. Id. at 1235.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 14, para. 107 (indicating that the fixed one year
period, "although perhaps arbitrary," was the best option).
63. See Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1235-36.
64. The Court mentioned that American courts have found that the concealment of children
is a negative factor under the Settled Defense. Id. at 1236.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1237-38 (Alito, J., concurring). The concurring opinion believes that "Article 12
places no limit on Article 18's grant of discretionary power to order return." Id. at 1237. Article
Eighteen states: "[tihe provisions of this Chapter [including Article Twelve] do not limit the
power of a judicial or administrative authority to order the return of the child at any time." Id.
Thus, the concurring opinion believes that Article 18 renders equitable tolling unnecessary. Id.
Further, contrary to Article Twelve, the concurring opinion opined that courts retain equitable
discretion to return a child even after the child has become settled in its new environment. Id.
7
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discretionary.67
IV. CONCLUSION
In the instant case, the Court sent a message to the international
community that the U.S. will not alter the terms of the treaties to which
it is a signatory. However, the Court's brief analysis concerning the effect
of ICARA may prove unworkable for lower courts in cases where
implementing legislation calls for the application of common-law
doctrines such as equitable tolling. Further, the Court brushed over the
extent of equitable discretion wielded by the courts under Article
Eighteen. By doing so, a court split will likely develop as to the
contradictory language found in Articles Eighteen and Twelve. The
preferable approach would be to consider concealment a negative factor
when determining whether a child has become settled. However, the
concurring opinion went too far by indicating that the courts should retain
the power to return children at any time, even after becoming settled.
67. The courts "shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the
child is now settled. Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 12.
[Vol. 27
8
Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol27/iss3/6
